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The comrade then gives some examples of how a parallel illegal apparatus became autonomous—in Berlin this apparatus broke away and plunged into armed struggles in Mansfeld. “It is nec­es­sary,” says Kun, “for the entire party or­gan­iza­tion to adapt itself to the forms of struggles in such a way that, by the very nature of its or­gan­iza­tion­al setup, it will be unable to break away either or­gan­iza­tion­ally or politically from the legal or­gan­iza­tion, even for a very short time.” He then protests against the Theses, which say at this point concerning the tasks of the party: “As a result of the state of siege, of exceptional laws, it is not pos­si­ble for these parties to carry on their entire work legally,” and he considers it nec­es­sary to create an illegal apparatus, while emphasizing that the party’s entire or­gan­iza­tion­al apparatus must be geared toward legal or illegal activity. And we attempt to make clear what this legal and illegal activity is, so that everyone sees that the or­gan­iza­tions should indeed be trained for legal and illegal work.

Now, someone will say there is too little in this section. Quite true. But someone else will say: too much. We believe we have found a happy medium to give an indication of this, to make it clear how one flows over into the other. Only when the party is really capable of comprehending this or­gan­iza­tion­al principle of democratic centralism: the obligation to do work; when it acts as a genuine collective of struggle in conducting agitation and propaganda, carrying out political struggles and producing its press; when the party implements what we have said in the structure of its party organism—only then can we assume that at the next Congress we will see parties which can truly be given the honorable title of Com­mu­nist Parties.

Comrades, with that I have come to the end of the main part of my speech. I still have to say a few words about the second section—which can be much shorter—on the or­gan­iza­tion­al structure of the Com­mu­nist In­ter­na­tion­al and its re­la­tion­ship to the member parties. In Moscow⁵ you found a proposal made by the German Com­mu­nist Party at its Party Committee meeting of May 5. Negotiations took place with rep­re­sen­ta­tives of the Ex­ecu­tive on the basis of this proposal and the result is now a resolution which I place before you for adoption, a resolution which actually fulfills all the essential wishes expressed in the German resolution.

So what are these wishes which we would like to have fulfilled? Some of them were already discussed when we heard the Ex­ecu­tive’s trade-union report. These matters were already taken care of in the resolution presented at the conclusion of the dis­cus­sion on the report of the Ex­ecu­tive. This resolution states: “The Congress expects that the Ex­ecu­tive, with the increased participation of the member parties in creating a better com­mu­ni­ca­tions ap­pa­ratus, and through the increased collaboration of the parties in the Ex­ecu­tive, will be able to fulfill its growing tasks to a greater extent than previously.”

In addition, this resolution calls for the parties to furnish their best personnel for the Ex­ecu­tive as the leadership of the whole in­ter­na­tion­al fighting move­ment. The resolution I am recommending to you for adoption was drafted from this political point of view. I will first read it to you and then perhaps motivate it with a few short remarks. The resolution reads:

The Third World Congress declares that the time has come in the development of the Com­mu­nist In­ter­na­tion­al to pass over from the stage of influencing the masses in the capitalist and colonial countries through propaganda and agitation, to the ever more tightly organized actual political and or­gan­iza­tion­al leadership of the rev­olu­tion­ary pro­le­tar­ian forces of all countries. The Ex­ecu­tive of the Com­mu­nist In­ter­na­tion­al shall be enlarged so as to enable it to take a position on all questions demanding action by the pro­le­tar­iat, such as, for example, the ever more burning problems of mass unemployment, the aggravation—laden with violent conflict—of the political relations of the capitalist governments (such as sanctions and the implementation of sanctions, peace treaties and the new arms race between America, England and Japan). Above and beyond the general calls issued on such critical questions up to now, the Ex­ecu­tive shall increasingly go over to finding ways and means to initiate in practice a unified or­gan­iza­tion­al and propa­gan­dis­tic intervention on in­ter­na­tion­al issues by the various sections. The Com­mu­nist In­ter­na­tion­al must mature into an In­ter­na­tion­al of the deed, into the in­ter­na­tion­al leadership of the com­mon daily struggle of the rev­olu­tion­ary pro­le­tar­iat of all countries. The prerequisites for this are:

I. The member parties of the Com­mu­nist In­ter­na­tion­al must do their utmost to maintain the closest and most active ties with the Ex­ecu­tive: they must not only provide the best rep­re­sen­ta­tives of their country for the Ex­ecu­tive, but must judiciously and persistently supply the Ex­ecu­tive with constant and reliable in­for­ma­tion so that the Ex­ecu­tive can take positions on political problems that arise based on actual documents and comprehensive materials.

II. The member parties must increasingly feel themselves to be in fact sections of a com­mon in­ter­na­tion­al party.

They must therefore maintain the closest in­for­ma­tional and or­gan­iza­tion­al ties among themselves, particularly when they are in neighboring countries and therefore have an equally intense interest in the political conflicts arising from capitalist antagonisms. This re­la­tion­ship of com­mon action can at present be initiated most effectively by sending rep­re­sen­ta­tives to each other’s most important con­fer­ences and by the exchange of suitable leading personnel. This exchange of leading personnel must immediately become an obligatory arrangement for all sections which are in any way capable of it.

III. The Ex­ecu­tive shall promote this nec­es­sary fusion of all national sections into a single In­ter­na­tion­al Party of com­mon pro­le­tar­ian propaganda and action by publishing a press correspondence in western Europe in all major languages, through which the application of the com­mu­nist idea must be made steadily clearer and more uniform, and which by providing reliable and steady in­for­ma­tion will establish the basis for active, simultaneous intervention by the various sections.

IV. By sending fully empowered members of the Ex­ecu­tive to western Europe and America, the Ex­ecu­tive must give effective or­gan­iza­tion­al support to the effort to achieve a genuine In­ter­na­tion­al of the com­mon daily struggle of the pro­le­tar­iat of all countries. The task of these rep­re­sen­ta­tives would be to acquaint the Ex­ecu­tive Committee with the particular conditions under which the Com­mu­nist Parties of the capitalist and colonial countries must struggle, and they would also have to make sure that these parties maintain the closest, most intimate ties both with the Ex­ecu­tive and with one another, increasing their collective striking power. The Ex­ecu­tive, along with the parties, shall ensure that com­mu­ni­ca­tion between it and the individual Com­mu­nist Parties—both in person through trusted rep­re­sen­ta­tives and through written correspondence—shall take place more frequently and more quickly than has been pos­si­ble to date, so that a com­mon position on all major political questions can be arrived at.

V. To be able to undertake this ex­traor­di­nari­ly increased activity, the Ex­ecu­tive must be considerably expanded. The Congress shall elect the president and shall instruct the Ex­ecu­tive to appoint three directing secretaries, to be drawn from different parties to the extent pos­si­ble. In addition to them, the members of the Ex­ecu­tive sent to Moscow by the various sections are obligated to take part in carrying out the ongoing work of the Ex­ecu­tive and Secretariat through their particular national departments or by taking over the handling of entire specific fields as rapporteurs. The countries which are to have voting members on the Ex­ecu­tive shall be determined by a special decision of the Congress, and the number of their votes shall also be regulated by Congress decision. The members of the administrative smaller bureau are elected specially by the Ex­ecu­tive.

VI. The seat of the Ex­ecu­tive Committee is Russia, the first pro­le­tar­ian state. When pos­si­ble, however, the Ex­ecu­tive shall attempt to expand its sphere of activity, including or­gan­iz­ing con­fer­ences outside Russia, to more and more firmly centralize the or­gan­iza­tion­al and political leadership of the entire In­ter­na­tion­al.⁶

I recommend that you adopt this resolution, after a preliminary discussion on it has taken place. It does not need much explanation; I would only like to emphasize in particular that the parties must really decide to place their best people at the disposal of the Ex­ecu­tive so that the demands of the res­olu­tion are implemented in this regard as well, namely that the individual rep­re­sen­ta­tives should serve on the Ex­ecu­tive not only as rapporteurs on their countries but also as experts on specific problems. We need such personnel. We cannot keep on de­manding that Russia furnish all these people, but rather we must send leading comrades here and see to it that the Ex­ecu­tive becomes more active. It is very easy to say that the Ex­ecu­tive must inform us concerning this or that case, for instance the Levi case; yet the rep­re­sen­ta­tives on the delegations trav­eled through Germany and spent at least 24 hours in Berlin, where they could have informed them­selves in detail. Such objections are in­ad­mis­si­ble in an in­ter­na­tion­al party that calls itself com­mu­nist.

Closer ties must be established in the In­ter­na­tion­al, and the individual sections must do everything to bring about such closer ties. Joint campaigns, joint assistance can take on very different forms. One should not think that the revolution is developing everywhere in a uniform way. There are a whole number of pos­si­bil­ities for mutual assistance in the most varied kinds of campaigns and propaganda. For example, if large dem­on­stra­tions are already taking place in one country, another country can take up these dem­on­stra­tions in its press, in its propaganda.

If dem­on­stra­tions over some in­ter­na­tion­al ques­tion have led to heavy losses and battles in one country, the other countries can at least un­con­di­tion­al­ly solidarize with the neighboring pro­le­tar­iat through speeches in parliament. If large-scale eco­nom­ic struggles break out where it is not yet pos­si­ble to provide really active assistance, the neigh­boring countries must be inspired by a fighting spirit that really gives expression to the workers’ fraternal support through appeals, rallies and financial con­tri­bu­tions. Thus there will be a whole series of pos­si­bil­ities for forging stronger ties among the national or­gan­iza­tions, not only ties between the Ex­ecu­tive and the individual parties.

The bourgeoisie is creating such centralization for itself. At the Congress of the Trade Union In­ter­na­tion­al, I had the opportunity to point out that just recently in Berlin the chief of political espionage, state prosecutor Weißmann, negotiated with the heads of the French and English secret police on creating an or­gan­iza­tion to prevent com­mu­nist troublemakers from escaping if Russia collapses or other such com­pli­ca­tions arise. They are preparing for every eventuality, even for the most contrived and ingenious pos­si­bil­ities. Seeing that the in­ter­na­tion­al bourgeoisie is already making such com­pli­cat­ed agreements across all borders, we too must take the first steps toward in­ter­na­tion­al parties, not only through resolutions but through practical or­gan­iza­tion­al measures as well. Only then will it be true that the In­ter­na­tion­al will really be the human race. (Vigorous applause)

SCHAFFNER (Switzerland): Comrades! I move that these Theses on or­gan­iza­tion­al questions be sent back to the Com­mis­sion without discussion as being an unsuitable basis for discussion. A Com­mis­sion was appointed some time ago which was supposed to draft these Theses. Instead we have before us 18 pages, written in a fairly questionable journalistic style, 18 pages of mishmash, which does indeed contain some good ideas, but is kept so vague, so blurred, that it does not deserve the name “Theses” at all. Because if we were to begin to criticize it here, we would have to begin with stylistic corrections, textual corrections; we would have to write the whole thing over again, so that any sort of discussion would be fruitless. So I request, or move, to reject these Theses without discussion, and to instruct the Com­mis­sion to meet tomorrow, not waiting until one o’clock but as early as pos­si­ble, so that new theses, which perhaps can take what is good and useful from these Theses, can be worked out and presented to the Congress.

I also move that the ex­traor­di­nari­ly important questions of reor­gan­iz­ing the In­ter­na­tion­al and the Ex­ecu­tive not be swept under the rug by a resolution which is highly debatable and, I believe, known to very few people in the entire hall, but rather that these questions which are of such great importance for the In­ter­na­tion­al be properly prepared by a com­mis­sion with rep­re­sen­ta­tives from all the delegations and that a com­mis­sion be appointed for this particular question as well, which is also to meet early tomorrow morning and present this work tomorrow evening.

ZINOVIEV: Comrades! It seems to me that comrade Schaffner has judged the Theses somewhat too categorically. He has moved to reject this “mishmash” without discussion. I think he is completely wrong. The Theses were drafted by a number of comrades. Perhaps the German wording worked out by our in­ter­na­tion­ally motley crew really is somewhat difficult to understand. But the content of these Theses is in my opinion quite correct and very good. They contain a great number of valuable and very important things for all the parties. I will cite only one section, for example the obligation of all members to do work, propaganda, etc. I believe, comrades, that we absolutely must and shall adopt these Theses by and large. But obviously this should happen after a discussion. If the comrades are so tired that no discussion can take place, or if the French version has not yet been distributed, then we should hold off on the discussion. First of all, the Com­mis­sion should work tomorrow, but by no means should the Theses simply be rejected. I repeat: anyone who has read the Theses attentively will come to the conclusion that they are by and large very good, quite correct and very important for the move­ment. (Agreement)

Comrades! No countermotion was made to comrade Schaffner’s second motion. I didn’t hear it. But I am told that comrade Schaffner moved to create a special com­mis­sion on the question of the composition of the Ex­ecu­tive. I believe, comrades, that all parties had the opportunity and today still have the opportunity to send rep­re­sen­ta­tives to the Organization Com­mis­sion. This Com­mis­sion should discuss the question. I remind you that we are very tired, that it would in fact be hard to put together a special com­mis­sion. The parties should be requested to send their rep­re­sen­ta­tives to the Organization Com­mis­sion, so that both questions can be dealt with in a single com­mis­sion. (Agreement)

[VAILLANT-COUTURIER]:⁷ Comrades, the French delegation has considered the question of the or­gan­iza­tion of the In­ter­na­tion­al previously raised by comrade Koenen, and yesterday evening our section meeting decided to request that the Congress create a com­mis­sion to study this question. But since we are faced with the fact that a com­mis­sion has already been appointed to study or­gan­iza­tion, we request that two sub-com­mis­sions be created immediately: one for the study of or­gan­iza­tion­al questions and the other concerning the or­gan­iza­tion of the In­ter­na­tion­al. We request that these com­mis­sions be set up at once, since the question of the or­gan­iza­tion of the Ex­ecu­tive Committee is exceedingly important.

KOLAROV (Chair): The Congress can take note of the proposal of the French delegation and pass it on to the Com­mis­sion, because it is of a practical nature.

Since no one else has requested the floor, I de­clare the debate on this question closed on condition that the Com­mis­sion deal most thor­ough­ly with all these extremely important ques­tions.

Before the session concludes, there are several announcements to be made.

VAILLANT-COUTURIER: It goes without say­ing that several delegates can be sent from each country.

KOLAROV (Chair): Several delegates can be sent by the Com­mis­sion, since there are two sub-com­mis­sions.

DELAGRANGE: You understand that we can­not debate the proposed Theses, since we do not yet even have them. The same thing will be true in the Com­mis­sion meeting tomorrow if the Theses do not get printed. Therefore the French delegation requests that it receive the Theses before the beginning of the Com­mis­sion meeting.

KOLAROV (Chair): Measures have already been taken to see to this.

Session adjourned 10:30 pm.

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⁴ This corresponds to point 48 in the final text of the Resolution. Back

⁵ Moscow was the daily journal of the Third Congress. The German Party’s proposal appeared in the French-language issue dated 10 July 1921. Back

⁶ This text is not the final text of the Resolution adopted by the Congress. See Resolution on the Or­gan­iza­tion of the Com­mu­nist In­ter­na­tion­al. Back

⁷ The German Protokoll shows no change of speaker here, but it is apparent that a representative of the French delegation is now speaking. The Russian stenographic report indicates that this is Vaillant-Couturier. Back

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End of Appendix A

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readiness of the workers to sacrifice, as guarantees of the demonstration’s effectiveness. It is vital to learn how to carry out such actions in a truly disciplined and well-organized fashion. Our own experiences have shown that it is best to base street dem­on­stra­tions on the major factories. To be sure, large dem­on­stra­tions starting in residential districts can also be staged on holidays as parades, so to speak, with flags. However, such dem­on­stra­tions usually do not have a rev­olu­tion­ary effect, but rather a certain demonstrative, festive character, a certain propaganda character. But if a truly rev­olu­tion­ary effect is to be achieved, then the workers must be mobilized for the demonstration straight from the factories.

In this connection the cells and fractions have ex­traor­di­nari­ly important preparations to make. After the preliminary discussions have taken place according to plan, and a unified mood—absolutely indispensable for carrying out such actions—has been created, then we can venture a step forward. But the or­gan­iza­tion, through the cells and fractions, must have fairly well assured this unified mood in the plants, so that we do not go into the streets as loosely organized masses inspired by a variety of ideas, but rather as a group of pro­le­tar­ians who know very well what they are demonstrating for. To have a sturdy framework for such dem­on­stra­tions, a system of cadres with authority in the plants, of the cell heads, must be set up along with the political leadership. If the time is deemed to be ripe for such dem­on­stra­tions, then the workers leaders in charge, the leading func­tion­aries, must get together with the cadres with authority in the plants to go through all the details of the action; on the next day, after such precise preparatory discussions, the demonstration can be carried out in a really unified, well-organized, disciplined way. But on the day of the demonstration as well, we need a good instrument which forms the backbone of the demonstration from the time it begins up to the time it disperses, and which is always on the spot. This is the only way the demonstration can be carried out with the least casualties but with the greatest effect. The experience gained in this action must then be studied and criticized in the group of func­tion­aries and plant council members in the fractions, so that the basis is really laid for repeating and strength­en­ing such dem­on­stra­tions, so that broadening such actions into rev­olu­tion­ary mass actions becomes pos­si­ble.

There are also other pos­si­bil­ities of campaigns to activate the masses. In all move­ments of the working class we always have the task of showing that we are truly the leaders of the pro­le­tar­iat. Everything must be done to overcome the influence of the social-traitor leaders and to force these people aside. In a period of stagnation one must strive to overcome this stagnation in the political and eco­nom­ic situation by employing other means of agitation, for example as the VKPD did last year with its “Open Letter.” I consider it superfluous to discuss these questions here in detail.

You will be able to read how we must effectively express the idea underlying this campaign through our plant fractions, trade-union func­tion­aries, in­volve­ment of our newspapers, of our parliamentary fractions. The or­gan­iza­tion must prove that it does not consider a matter disposed of once it has written about it; it must prove that, if it is convinced of the rightness of its campaign, it is capable of really carrying it out and of intensifying it for weeks and months. But it is impermissible to make the error—for instance after gathering support for a form, such as was reached with the “Open Letter,” in numerous meetings, by whipping up the mood in the news­papers, through speakers in the parliamentary bodies—of then not carrying this campaign forward but rather allowing it to slack off. This kind of slackening in a campaign is the most serious mis­take that or­gan­iza­tions can make. If they cannot sustain a campaign, carry it out, then they should not initiate it in the first place but rather be content with less—they should restrict themselves to or­gan­iza­tion­al consolidation.

If in this way we succeed in winning a degree of leadership in a particular eco­nom­ic sector where our party possesses our best or­gan­iza­tions and where it has encountered the most widespread agreement with its demands, then or­gan­iza­tion­al pressure must be propa­gan­dis­tically exploited to achieve rec­og­ni­tion within the unions, etc., of the party’s leading role. Our comrades must then succeed in calling con­fer­ences of those local bodies that come out in favor of our demands; at such con­fer­ences, in turn, joint demands must be accepted. Besides adopting these resolutions, it is then nec­es­sary to con­soli­date the real move­ments as well, to make sure that all those taking part in these campaigns do everything they can to draw together move­ments which are already in progress or are on the verge of breaking out, so that they become a unified move­ment.

In this move­ment the com­mu­nist leadership will then bring about a new concentration of power which in turn will have an impact on the social-traitor leaders. For, faced with such struggles under unified leadership, these leaders can no longer evade the issue but have to show their colors, say clearly what they want. And if we do not succeed in really harnessing them to the wagon, so to speak, then it is nec­es­sary to unmask them, to expose not only politically but also in practical or­gan­iza­tion­al terms the fact that they have no intention at all of leading joint, militant move­ments of the pro­le­tar­iat. In that case we intervene independently.

But if a com­mu­nist party has to make the attempt to seize leadership of the masses at a time of serious upheaval, of acute eco­nom­ic and political tensions, then it will have to use other methods than those of mere propaganda. It can even dispense with raising any other special slogans and demands. At such times, when the move­ments are growing and literally pushing toward explosions, it will have to address open calls to the workers who are on the verge of pauperization and therefore pressing for action, address the organized workers who have the leadership of such struggles wholly in their hands, to demonstrate to them that there can be no more abstention from these struggles, that the leadership of these struggles, however, cannot be allowed to remain in the hands of the social-traitors. Instead, a combative, determined leadership is now needed and the com­mu­nists are combative enough to lead these small-scale struggles of the pro­le­tar­iat, to con­soli­date these small-scale struggles into major political ones.

What must be proved in these struggles is that, despite the fact that the pro­le­tar­iat’s last pos­si­bil­ities for existence are being undermined, the old or­gan­iza­tions are trying to avoid and obstruct this struggle. The plant and trade-union or­gan­iza­tions must make it clear in meetings, continually pointing to the combativeness of the com­mu­nist workers, that abstention from the struggle is no longer permissible, and if no other party wants to take the leadership the Com­mu­nist Party is the only one left to show the way out of this pauperization.

But the main task is to unify the struggles born of the situation. The cells and fractions in the trades and plants involved in such move­ments must not only stay in the closest or­gan­iza­tion­al contact with one another but also maintain ties with the district committees and party centers. And the party centers must be committed to sending specially delegated comrades to all the areas where move­ments are taking place, who will seek to seize the leadership in these districts and to make sure that the unitary idea underlying these struggles actually comes to the fore, so that all workers recognize this unitary character and finally begin to perceive the political character of these struggles.

As such struggles become generalized it will be nec­es­sary to create unified bodies to lead them. If the bu­reau­crat­ic strike leaderships of the unions cave in prematurely, we must be quick to push for new elections, attempting to fill the strike leadership posts with com­mu­nists. If several wage struggles have already been successfully combined and several political uprisings successfully tied into these move­ments—for example, preventing troop trans­ports—then a com­mon leadership must be set up for the campaign, which to the extent pos­si­ble must consist of com­mu­nists, who should occupy the leading positions. In this way, trade-union fractions, plant councils, plant council plenary meetings, can provide such joint actions which represent the core—the basis—for the com­mu­nist leadership, which should make the nec­es­sary preparations.

But if the move­ment takes on the desired political character through the interference of employers’ or­gan­iza­tions or the intervention of government authorities, then propaganda for political workers councils must be pushed through with the nec­es­sary ruthlessness, even without trade unions. If the com­mu­nists work carefully and intensively, and weigh their alternatives, they can gain the leadership of the pro­le­tar­iat in extensive areas through partial actions and become capable of larger struggles. But parties which have already grown strong, particularly the mass parties, should also take special or­gan­iza­tion­al measures to be ready for decisive political mass actions. In mass actions, partial actions, etc., it must constantly be kept in mind that the experience of these move­ments must be energetically used for ever more solid ties with the broader masses.

The ties with the masses are the main thing. In plant con­fer­ences the party leaders in charge must repeatedly discuss the experience of the mass actions with the shop stewards, with the plant fractions, trade-union fractions, to make their re­la­tion­ship with these shop stewards more and more solid. Close bonds of mutual trust between the leading func­tion­aries and the shop stewards are or­gan­iza­tion­ally the best guarantee that political mass actions will not be initiated prematurely and that their scope will correspond to the circumstances, considering the current level of party influence. Based on such a network of tested shop stewards in the plants, a large number of or­gan­iza­tions have led successful move­ments. If we look at the Russians’ revolution, we know that in Petersburg the decisive struggles were led by such a network of plant fractions, shop stewards and cells, which were very closely tied to the leadership.

But for Germany as well we can say that the last decisive struggles—in the last general strike before the conclusion of the war in 1917, in central Germany, in Berlin in the spring, in Berlin in the winter of 1918, the November revolution and the subsequent March struggles—could only have been carried out and achieved because there increasingly took shape a solid network of shop stewards which maintained the closest ties with the political leaders. Having allied themselves with the shop stewards, these leaders had the most profound influence on the masses. I remind you again that among many others it was Karl Liebknecht who always sought the closest ties with the stewards in the plants.

So all parties should do their utmost to establish these ties with the plants through the shop stewards. A very high degree of flexibility is guaranteed by this. We saw in Germany that precisely through these highly perfected or­gan­iza­tion­al ties, which had nothing mechanical about them but rather grew out of the move­ment, it was the shop stewards who were able to lead the masses forward in the nec­es­sary armed struggles. Last year in Italy—to make a criticism—the move­ment, which was un­ques­tion­ably a rev­olu­tion­ary one and found its strongest expression in the factory occupations, failed because of the union bureaucracy’s betrayal and the inadequate leadership of the party. But on the other hand it must be said that one of the main reasons for the collapse of the move­ment was that the factories were occupied without a thought of creating, through shop stewards, intimate ties between all the factories and the political leadership. So there too, a real, extensive system of shop stewards would have made it pos­si­ble to carry the activity forward, to turn it into a real rev­olu­tion­ary mass move­ment, had close ties existed between these groups. I also believe that it would have been pos­si­ble to utilize the great English miners move­ment if the English Party had been able to create the very closest ties with the masses through the shop stewards in every workforce.

We see how nec­es­sary it is in utilizing the situation to build up such a really active network of shop stewards, plant fractions, etc., which is the backbone of all the real activity of the parties.

Through such shop stewards and plant fractions we will not only be able to make the party as a whole more active and capable of carrying out campaigns, but will also, by virtue of the fact that the working masses see a leadership, strengthen their trust in this leadership. We will get them to have the greatest confidence in precisely this leadership, which demonstrates that it is in close touch with the factories.

I come now to the section on the structure of the party organism. In general, like the section on the press, this can be treated more briefly, although you might well demand that we go into detail on how the party is built. But we are speaking not of building the party apparatus but of the move­ment, of the formation of our troops and our groups. Regarding the framework of the party apparatus, we can restrict ourselves to giving some general instructions which have proved useful.

Here too one must bear in mind that the or­gan­iza­tion can be effective only if it spreads outward from the centers of power, from the main cities and industrial centers. It would be wrong to go home from Moscow now and say, we’re supposed to extend a network of or­gan­iza­tions over the whole country; for under certain circumstances this network might be so weak that our forces could not be utilized. It is much more important to build up or­gan­iza­tions for the main cities and industrial centers where the masses are present, where the or­gan­iza­tion can really be significant. Once an or­gan­iza­tion has been firmly established in the large towns, forces that can be spared should be used to extend an or­gan­iza­tion­al network from the centers over the surrounding areas, but always with the proviso that local branches and new districts are formed only when a corps of members is present in the individual towns. This will guarantee the practical capacities of the or­gan­iza­tion.

The party with the best or­gan­iza­tion is not the one with the most branches, but the one with many capable, strong branches, and then only when this capability is demonstrated in the character of their political propaganda and activity. In the course of extending the or­gan­iza­tion more com­pli­cat­ed situations will often be encountered, perhaps a concentration of large cities in one area. Under some circumstances it will also be nec­es­sary to build on the basis of rural or­gan­iza­tions.

It is also important to establish ties of a flexible nature between the districts and the leading bodies. Here it is not nec­es­sary to set up a hierarchical structure of locals, counties, districts, regions and the party center. This could be a grave danger to the party’s political flexibility. The point is to bring all places where party forces are con­cen­trat­ed into immediate contact with the center by dividing the country up into districts, creating independent districts wherever a number of cities are con­cen­trat­ed, districts which will also receive in­for­ma­tion directly from the party. In general the mutual exchange of in­for­ma­tion and instruction is an important task the or­gan­iza­tion­al apparatus has to fulfill. What Béla Kun says on this subject in his pamphlet is correct:

In the party there has been a complete lack of political correspondence and of continual, direct and systematic verbal instruction. The natural foundation for this instruction is a systematic in­for­ma­tion service.

Such a thorough, systematic in­for­ma­tion service, which is a vital necessity, must protect the Party against routinism and bureaucratization. Béla Kun says at another point:

Only an in­for­ma­tion service that has become mechanical but is free of the defects of any kind of routinism will make pos­si­ble the sort of in­for­ma­tion work which will fully unify the work of the party and create a real and firm centralization.

Providing ongoing, regular, good in­for­ma­tion, along with the obligation to do work, is the best way of overcoming bureaucratism.

In our guidelines on structure we also give a se­ries of instructions on how to build the party center so that it will be flexible. I would like to remind all parties of this point, number 40.⁴ We refer there to the division of labor. We point out that the division of labor in the districts must be implemented cen­tral­ly. But a continual rotation of personnel must occur there as well.

One more word on this rotation of personnel. Comrades who had been active for a long time as political secretaries sometimes became very bu­reau­crat­ic in this work. It did them a lot of good when we removed them from these posts and made them into editors. On the other hand the editors were inclined to underrate or­gan­iza­tion­al work, and it was very good to put editors in such or­gan­iza­tion­al posts and the comrades from the or­gan­iza­tion on the editorial staff. The party definitely benefited from this: the former editors did excellent work in the or­gan­iza­tion just as the former secretaries did well on the editorial staff. But we also had good experience rotating such func­tion­aries in cam­paigns. Functionaries who had become rooted in districts where they had all sorts of personal and family ties and could absolutely not be gotten moving were our best forces when we transferred them to another district. Thus this personnel ro­ta­tion was a means for enlivening the party. There is al­so a series of modifications to this section, which have been distributed to you.

I will go on now to the last section: legal and illegal work. The title of the section is misleading and will also be changed. What is described there is that the illegal and legal party are not two different things but rather continually overlap. Here we must correct the resolutions of the Second Congress a bit. Comrade Béla Kun in his pamphlet hit the correct formulation in speaking of “the great or­gan­iza­tion­al task of placing the whole party at the service of illegal or­gan­iza­tion­al preparation to make revolu­tionary struggles a reality.”

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